Press release Results of the Q3 2016 ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)

MIL OSI – Source: European Central Bank – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Press release Results of the Q3 2016 ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)

PRESS RELEASE

22 July 2016

Real GDP growth expectations have been revised downwards for 2017 and 2018. Longer-term growth expectations are unchanged.

Inflation expectations have been revised slightly down for 2017 and 2018. Longer-term inflation expectations are unchanged at 1.8%.

Unemployment rate expectations remain broadly unchanged on a declining trajectoryRespondents to the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for the third quarter of 2016 have revised downwards their expectations for growth in euro area economic activity for both next year and the following one. The average point forecast now stands at 1.4% for 2017 (revised down by 0.2 percentage point) and at 1.6% for 2018 (revised down by 0.1 percentage point). Based on the information provided by the respondents, these revisions largely reflect an expected negative impact on the euro area from the UK referendum result.
The Q3 2016 SPF average point forecasts for inflation in 2016, 2017 and 2018 stand at 0.3%, 1.2% and 1.5% respectively. This implies that forecasts for 2016 are unchanged, while those for 2017 and 2018 have been revised slightly downwards, by 0.1 percentage point, compared with the survey round from the second quarter of 2016. Average longer-term inflation expectations (for 2021) remain unchanged at 1.8%. The balance of risks around this forecast is assessed as remaining on the downside.
Unemployment rate expectations remain broadly unchanged on a declining trajectory. The average point forecasts for the unemployment rate are 10.1% for 2016, 9.7% for 2017 and 9.5% for 2018.

Table: Results of the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters for Q3 2016
(annual percentage changes, unless otherwise indicated)

Survey horizon
2016
2017
2018
Longer term (1)HICP inflation

 
 
 
 SPF Q3 2016

0.3
1.2
1.5
1.8Previous SPF (Q2 2016)

0.3
1.3
1.6
1.8Real GDP growth

 
 
 
 SPF Q3 2016

1.5
1.4
1.6
1.7Previous SPF (Q2 2016)

1.5
1.6
1.7
1.7Unemployment rate (2)

 
 
 
 SPF Q3 2016

10.1
9.7
9.5
8.8Previous SPF (Q2 2016)

10.1
9.7
9.3
8.8(1) Long-term expectations refer to 2021 for SPF Q3 2016 and to 2020 for the SPF Q2 2016.
(2) As a percentage of the labour force.
For media enquiries, please contact Stefan Ruhkamp, tel.: +49 69 1344 5057.

Notes

The ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is conducted on a quarterly basis and gathers expectations for the rates of inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment in the euro area for several horizons, together with a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty surrounding them. The participants in the survey are experts affiliated with financial or non-financial institutions based within the European Union. The survey results do not represent the views of the ECB’s decision-making bodies or of the ECB’s staff. The next ECB staff macroeconomic projections will be published on 8 September 2016.

Since 2015 the results of the SPF have been released on the ECB’s website. For surveys prior to the first quarter of 2015, see the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin (2002-14: Q1 – February, Q2 – May, Q3 – August, Q4 – November).

The SPF survey for the third quarter of 2016 was conducted between 30 June and 6 July 2016. The total number of responses was 51, which is slightly below the historical average number of responses (54) for the Q3 (July) round.

The SPF report and data are available via the SPF webpage and via the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse.

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Press conference Mario Draghi: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)

MIL OSI – Source: European Central Bank – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Press conference Mario Draghi: Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)

Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB,Frankfurt am Main, 21 July 2016
Jump to the transcript of the questions and answers
Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Dombrovskis.
Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, we confirm that the monthly asset purchases of €80 billion are intended to run until the end of March 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim.
Today we discussed developments since our last monetary policy meeting in early June. Following the UK referendum on EU membership, our assessment is that euro area financial markets have weathered the spike in uncertainty and volatility with encouraging resilience. The announced readiness of central banks to provide liquidity, if needed, and our accommodative monetary policy measures, as well as a robust regulatory and supervisory framework, have all helped to keep market stress contained. Financing conditions remain highly supportive, which contributes to a strengthening in credit creation. They continue to support our baseline scenario of an ongoing economic recovery and an increase in inflation rates.
At the same time, given prevailing uncertainties, the Governing Council will continue to monitor economic and financial market developments very closely and to safeguard the pass-through of its accommodative monetary policy to the real economy. Over the coming months, when we have more information, including new staff projections, we will be in a better position to reassess the underlying macroeconomic conditions, the most likely paths of inflation and growth, and the distribution of risks around those paths. If warranted to achieve its objective, the Governing Council will act by using all the instruments available within its mandate.
Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Euro area real GDP increased by 0.6%, quarter on quarter, in the first quarter of 2016, after 0.4% in the last quarter of 2015. Growth continues to be supported by domestic demand, while export growth has remained modest. Incoming data point to ongoing growth in the second quarter of 2016, though at a lower rate than in the first quarter. Looking ahead, we continue to expect the economic recovery to proceed at a moderate pace. Domestic demand remains supported by the pass-through of our monetary policy measures to the real economy. Favourable financing conditions and improvements in corporate profitability continue to promote a recovery in investment. Sustained employment gains, which are also benefiting from past structural reforms, and still relatively low oil prices provide additional support for households’ real disposable income and thus for private consumption. In addition, the fiscal stance in the euro area is expected to be mildly expansionary in 2016 and to turn broadly neutral in 2017 and 2018.
At the same time, headwinds to the economic recovery in the euro area include the outcome of the UK referendum and other geopolitical uncertainties, subdued growth prospects in emerging markets, the necessary balance sheet adjustments in a number of sectors and a sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms. Against this background, the risks to the euro area growth outlook remain tilted to the downside.
According to Eurostat, euro area annual HICP inflation in June 2016 was 0.1%, up from -0.1% in May, mainly reflecting higher energy and services price inflation. Looking ahead, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, inflation rates are likely to remain very low in the next few months before starting to pick up later in 2016, in large part owing to base effects in the annual rate of change of energy prices. Supported by our monetary policy measures and the expected economic recovery, inflation rates should increase further in 2017 and 2018.
Turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (M3) continued to increase at a robust pace in May 2016, with its annual rate of growth standing at 4.9%, after 4.6% in April. As in previous months, annual growth in M3 was mainly supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 expanding at an annual rate of 9.1% in May, after 9.7% in April.
Loan dynamics followed the path of gradual recovery observed since the beginning of 2014. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) increased to 1.4% in May 2016, compared with 1.2% in April. Developments in loans to enterprises continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) remained broadly stable at 1.6% in May, after 1.5% in April.
The euro area bank lending survey for the second quarter of 2016 indicates further improvements in loan supply conditions for loans to enterprises and households and a continued increase in loan demand across all loan categories. Furthermore, banks continued to report that the targeted longer-term refinancing operations had contributed to more favourable terms and conditions on loans.
The monetary policy measures in place since June 2014 have significantly improved borrowing conditions for firms and households, as well as credit flows across the euro area. The comprehensive package of new monetary policy measures adopted in March this year underpins the ongoing upturn in loan growth, thereby supporting the recovery of the real economy. In the light of the prevailing uncertainties, it is essential that the bank lending channel continues to function well.
To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need to preserve an appropriate degree of monetary accommodation in order to secure a return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to, 2% without undue delay.
Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term and its accommodative stance supports economic activity. As emphasised repeatedly by the Governing Council, and as again strongly echoed in both European and international policy discussions, in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute much more decisively, both at the national and at the European level. The implementation of structural reforms needs to be substantially stepped up to reduce structural unemployment and boost potential output growth in the euro area. Structural reforms are necessary in all euro area countries, although specific reform needs differ across the individual economies. The focus should be on actions to raise productivity and improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure, which are vital to increase investment and boost job creation. The enhancement of current investment initiatives, including the extension of the Juncker plan, progress on the capital markets union and reforms that will improve the resolution of non-performing loans will also contribute positively to this objective. In an environment of accommodative monetary policy, the swift and effective implementation of structural reforms, in line with the 2016 country-specific recommendations recently approved by the European Council, will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the euro area but will also make the euro area more resilient to global shocks. Fiscal policies should also support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the European Union. Full and consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact over time and across countries is crucial to maintain confidence in the fiscal framework. At the same time, all countries should strive for a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies.
We are now at your disposal for questions.
* * *
Question: Brexit has revived concerns that you will run out of bonds to buy for the quantitative easing programme. Did the Governing Council consider today whether to relax the rules, or was there any discussion of whether to relax the rules for government bond purchases, including potentially moving from the capital key rule? And would the Governing Council consider buying either equities or bank debt under QE?
Draghi: As I said before, we discussed the general economic conditions and we concluded that we didn’t have yet information to take decisions, and we decided, as I said, that over the coming months when we have more information, including new staff projections, we’ll be in a better position to reassess the underlying macroeconomic conditions. No attention was really given to discuss specific instruments at this point in time.
Question: The IMF in its recent update of the World Economic Outlook singled out Italian and Portuguese banks as one of the risks for the outlook. Is that a view that you share? Is it one of the risks that you’re taking into account in your considerations?
And do you think that some degree of public support for banks in the eurozone is acceptable or indeed desirable?
Draghi: As I just said in the introductory statement, monetary policy is certainly supportive of economic activity and is focused on maintaining price stability. But also other policy measures are needed in order to reap the full benefits of our monetary policy, and one of them is to address the non-performing loans and more generally non-performing exposures in the euro area. So that is a very important reform, and we certainly consider it important. I wouldn’t say we consider it a risk, as you said, but certainly it has to be addressed. It’s a complex problem. We may actually come back on it later on.
On the other question, we have in place the rules. We have in place rules of state aid, we have the BRRD, and as I said several times, these rules contain all the flexibility to cope with exceptional circumstances. The power and the responsibility in activating these rules and in complying with these rules lies with the Commission.
Question: I believe you have the Survey of Professional Forecasters available, and I was wondering whether that was conducted after Brexit, and what that shows, whether that had an impact on the growth and inflation forecasts.
And you’ve said repeatedly that you need more data and you need more time to assess the exact impact, but it seems to be generally that most observers expect it to be a question of when and how much you might act. Do you think that people who assume that are running ahead a little bit? Is there a fair chance that you’ve actually done enough?
Draghi: On the first point, frankly, I can’t remember whether the forecast was done before or after. What I know is that on inflation outlook, Brexit didn’t seem to have any major impact at this point in time. Since we’re speaking about inflation expectations, it’s worthwhile pointing out that we have an increasing divergence between the SPF expectations and the market-based expectations. The SPF expectations basically remained the same: 0.3% this year, 1.2% next year, 1.5% in 2018, and 1.8% is the medium/long-term expectation of the SPF. So pretty anchored.
On the other hand we have the market-based inflation expectations, which in the days immediately after Brexit fell significantly. One immediate explanation was that there are technical factors that caused such a decline, namely that the impact on nominal bond yields was bigger than the impact on the linkers, and that reinforced this effect. On the other hand, even when the market sentiment recovered, we haven’t really witnessed a similar recovery of the market-based inflation expectations. So again, we can’t say much about this at this stage. We need a little more time to assess what is the state of the market-based inflation expectations.
On your second question, I just simply reiterate what I said before: I said that over the coming months, when we have more information, including new staff projections, we will be in a better position to reassess the underlying macroeconomic conditions and likely paths and so on. But there is one last sentence that I want to stress in response to your question: if warranted, to achieve its objective, the Governing Council will act by using all instruments available within its mandate. So I would stress readiness, willingness, ability to do so.
Question: So far banks have suffered most from Brexit, it seems. They are very important for the transmission of monetary policy, so do you see maybe there’s some need to act?
My second question is concerning – at the moment bond purchases are linked to the capital key. Would you change that within the near future?
Draghi: I’ll answer the first question. You’re right, banks are important. Especially important for the eurozone, which is basically a bank-based economy, where the credit intermediation goes mostly through the bank lending channel. Bank equities in the aftermath of the Brexit were especially hit, and especially in the eurozone, and especially those banks with a high share of NPLs, of non-performing loans. Bank equity prices are of some significance for policymakers, because if they drop in the way they did, one would assume, if this is to stay, cost of capital would increase, and therefore the net return on lending would decrease and would suggest on the banking side a more conservative lending behaviour. That’s why we do care about bank equity prices for the transmission of our monetary policy.
But let’s consider this in a little more, I would say the right perspective, but also the medium-term perspective. On the solvency side our banks are better, if not much better, than they were before. Let me give you one number: the average CET1 – the CET1 for the 130 banks directly supervised by the SSM – was 9% in 2012, and it’s around 13% today. So from a solvency viewpoint one would conclude that a series of actions that have been undertaken in the last three, four years – like new regulation, supervision, a robust supervisory system and regulatory design; but also a new harmonised standard of classification of NPLs, and certainly substantial provisioning against these NPLs and other forms of weak parts of the balance sheet; and finally the role that our monetary policy played in this period of time – these are the reasons why banks are today better, if not much better, than they were in 2009.
So what is the problem? The problem now that we will have to address is the weak profitability ahead, not a problem of solvency. As you know, next week, on 29 July, the EBA will publish the outcome of the most recent stress tests for 51 banks in the European Union, including 37 significant institutions directly supervised by the SSM. Moreover, the SSM has conducted the same stress test for an additional 56 banks under its direct supervision. And these stress tests will be one input to determine the Pillar 2 supervisory capital demands by the end of this year.
So then, what about the NPLs? We’ve said that the NPLs are certainly a significant problem for the future profitability, and for the capacity, the ability that the banks have of lending. So it is a problem that needs to be addressed because it’s an obstacle to the transmission of monetary policy. One would say that the solution of the NPL problem is based on three pillars. First of all, a consistent supervisory approach. Second, the development of a fully-functioning NPL market. And third, government action, and first of all passing that legislation that would foster the development of an NPL market. And this certainly involves a revision of existing personal and corporate bankruptcy legislation, but also other actions, and possibly also having a public backstop when at times of exceptional circumstances the NPL market is not well functioning, and certainly we want to avoid fire sales.
As regards the second question: the answer is no. We had no discussion about that. No attention was given to that.
Question: Just to go back to the effect of Brexit on the eurozone, I understand the ECB thinks it’s going to hit growth by about 0.5% over three years. Assuming there was that kind of shock, would that be sufficient to extend the bond purchases beyond March, which is coming up fairly soon?
The second question is on the QE programme. Assuming you did face scarcities in bond markets, how difficult do you think it would be to change the parameters? Do you see any legal challenges? Are there more legal challenges with changing the capital key, for instance, than dropping the deposit floor or taking another approach?
Draghi: On your first question, the figure that circulated in the aftermath of Brexit was exactly what you said, an impact of 0.2% to 0.5% over three years. I believe the Commission has come out with a similar figure of 0.25% to 0.5%. I think we should take these estimates with some grain of caution. I said it before: uncertainties, large uncertainties prevail, because first of all these figures will in the end depend on how long is going to be the stretch of time for these negotiations to be completed and therefore to give a certain outlook, which we don’t have with us today; and second, these figures will also depend on what kind of outcome is going to come out. So I think they have to be taken with a certain grain of caution.
What is clear is that financial markets, and also the banking sector, in spite of the large changes in the stock prices, have reacted in a fairly resilient fashion to the event. We haven’t observed any disruption, neither in the financial markets sector nor in the banking sector, and this was certainly caused by the large liquidity being abundant; by also all the preparations that all central banks had undertaken before, ensuring that liquidity lines would be available; and certainly by the accommodative monetary policies undertaken by all central banks at the present time. But also because of, in a sense, what I was saying before: by the more robust regulatory system all over the world. That ensured resilience by markets and banks. So I think it’s too early to say what is going to be the final impact. The only thing we can say is that it’s a risk that has materialised, and it’s a downside risk.
As far as your other question is concerned, it’s about, I would say, the possible execution difficulties that our QE programme may have to face. First let me say that we view our QE programme and our TLTRO programme, all our monetary policy measures, as having been quite successful. They are underpinning the economic recovery. They are underpinning the return of inflation to our objective. Second, as I had the opportunity to say before, we didn’t give attention today to the discussion of specific instruments, but in the past we’ve given enough evidence, not only of our readiness to act and our willingness to act, but also of being able to adapt our programmes so as to reach the objective of a purchase of €80 billion a month until March 2017, and beyond if needed. And I think in worrying about the coming months, whether we’ll be able to actually fulfil this objective or not, I think proper attention should be given to the evidence that we’ve given in the past few months, and our ability to exploit the flexibility that the design of our programme gives us.
Question: The ECB has recently published an article that illustrates its various ways of estimating the output gap, which is quite an elusive number, with the measure that was considered more robust pointing to a 6% output gap, which is bigger than most estimates. My question is, what is the measure that you consider most convincing of the output gap, and what conclusions do you draw from that study?
My second question is if you have already started considering tapering or other ways of closing the asset purchase, especially given the widespread expectation that asset purchases will eventually be extended past March 2017.
Draghi: I’m aware of that paper, of course. It’s an estimate of the output gap. As you yourself said, it’s an elusive concept. There are several ways to estimate it. And we do take into account the various definitions of output gap when we design our monetary policy, including the one you mentioned. That’s, I think, the answer to your question.
Constâncio: Just to add that I had quoted that work of our experts last year in my speech at Jackson Hole, among other, also internal, estimates of the output gap, which means there is a whole range of internal calculations with different models that go from -2% to -6%. So we cannot really make a choice in a very concrete way and say, “This is better than the other one.” By the way, this model that comes out with 6%, simplifying it, reaches that conclusion based on the assumption that the variables in the model would explain what has happened to inflation, and to achieve that reverse engineered, then it concludes that the output gap should have been -6% in order to explain the inflation that actually happened. But that’s totally model-dependent. So everything has to be really analysed with all the uncertainties behind such a concept.
Draghi: Your other question was about tapering: no, we have not discussed it.
Question: You’ve said in this press room in the past that countries like Portugal or Spain have done substantial efforts in terms of structural reforms. Do you consider that a country like Spain, which has reduced the deficit from 11% to 5% of GDP, which has approved labour, pension reforms, financial reforms, deserves a sanction that can be counterproductive in economic and political terms? And do you think that the sanction could be a risk for the stability of the eurozone if we have problems in the Portuguese financial system or a change in the fiscal stance of the eurozone as a whole?
Draghi: The decision about sanctioning Spain, or other countries for that matter, is entirely in the hands of the Commission, which has, as in other cases, the responsibility, the power and the knowledge to take a decision.
Question: The G20 meeting will be held this weekend in China. What kind of message do you want to send to your colleagues at this upcoming meeting? And do you see another downside risk outside of Europe?
Draghi: The message that will probably come out ­– well, the message that will come out, the message that I can foresee or expect to come out, will be a message of stability, and the message that will come out specifically from the eurozone will be a message of a recovery that continues, though at a slower pace, in the midst of great uncertainties. Uncertainties that are not only – or not especially, actually – coming from the eurozone, but they come from various parts of the world. And in this climate of general uncertainty, not necessarily economic uncertainty but probably mostly geopolitical uncertainty, it’s very important that a message of stability comes out of the G20. Policies are everywhere very accommodative. The financial system and the banking system are stronger than they were before, and so it’s very important that a message like that comes out.
Question: Earlier this week, the Bundesbank made a proposal about strengthening the role of the ESM in case of crisis of countries, especially when there is a restructuring of the debt needed, and basically the proposal is to rethink what is called the troika –in reality it’s a quartet. I was wondering what you think about this position, if there was a discussion on this in the Governing Council or what you think about this.
The second question is, how worried are you about the developments in Turkey, and how can these developments, which are very worrying, I think, generally, have an impact on the recovery and the situation in the eurozone?
Draghi: On the first question, as you know, we are part of the troika because of legislation, the six-pack, the two-pack, that was passed years ago. At that time there was a good reason for involving the ECB in the programme countries. The eurozone didn’t have any experience with how to manage these situations, and so it made sense to have all the players in: the IMF, the Commission and the ECB. There was also a good case for the ECB to be part of this, so that the ECB could actually have information about the solvency and about the financial stability of the states where the monetary policy counterparties would reside.
Now, through the years actors have acquired experience, and the ECB, especially in the last two years, has carved a role which is both minor and more specific to its capacities, to its skills, namely the financial and the banking sector in these countries. Now, to change the troika we need to change legislation. It’s not our task. It’s the European Parliament, it’s the legislators, it’s the Ecofin, it’s the Eurogroup, and so on. And so we are ready to give our contribution to that extent.
On your second question, Turkey: it’s very difficult to understand how these big geopolitical uncertainties would affect the recovery, because the channels are not obvious. For example, in the case of Brexit there is an obvious channel, which is the trade channel, but is it the most relevant channel to express the impact of such an event on the eurozone? One would rather think about the confidence channel or, for example, the financial service channels. Now in the case of Turkey it’s very likely that all these events might affect the confidence, but it’s very difficult to foresee significant impact on the eurozone recovery, at least in the immediate future.
Question: I realise the corporate bond purchases have started fairly recently, but I’m wondering if you can give us an assessment of whether it’s met your expectations so far in bringing you closer to your mandate.
And also I wonder – this may be kind of an obvious question – but I wonder if you can sort of explain the transmission mechanism for that part of the asset purchase programme as you see it. I’ve seen some reports questioning how that’s actually going to bring you closer to your mandate.
Draghi: In terms of results, we see inflation moving forward according to our baseline scenario. If anything there was a better-than-expected development in recent times, when headline inflation moved from -0.1% to +0.1%, and that’s essentially due to changes in the price of energy. But even if we exclude food and energy we saw a positive development in the services inflation. We should also keep in mind, however, that core inflation is being set at values where no uptick has been shown now for several months. So I think we’re moving forward at the pace which was expected according to our baseline. By year end there are certain base effects concerning the oil prices which will make inflation go up and stay for the next year at 1.2%, if I’m not mistaken, over next year. So we will see these effects by year end.
We should also ask the counterfactual. Our monetary policy measures have been undertaken at the time when we had many other contrary factors or headwinds going against, so we should ask ourselves what would have happened in the absence of these monetary policy measures. But when we look at the consequences, the impact that our monetary policy measures had on financial markets, I think there is no doubt that they’ve been highly effective. Just to give you an idea of recent, just a few days: our measure of lending rates – it’s a composite average of bank lending rates – is now at a historical minimum. We never saw lower rates. The bank lending survey shows that now credit conditions and credit volumes are improving and they have been constantly improving now for several months.
But even more importantly, when we ask banks – incidentally, the bank lending survey was taken before and after the Brexit, so banks had been given the opportunity to tell us, “Is what happened changing your views?” and none of them seem to have given an answer to that, so perhaps it’s just too early, but we didn’t have any feedback from Brexit into their answers. But basically, when we are asking, “Why is credit going up? What is motivating your lending decisions?” they answer, “Competition. Competition between banks.” When two or three years ago credit growth was still negative, the main answer to the question “What is the main motivation behind your lending decision?” was “Risk.” So that’s the important thing. They’ve been giving this answer about competition being the main driver now for several months.
And we consider this to be basically a product of our monetary policy measures. So all this is being passed through to the real economy. We’re seeing this through the gradual economic recovery, which is moving forward at a steady and moderate pace. Not to mention, of course, all the figures that I mentioned in the past, namely stock prices, namely spreads, spreads between – we can say the fragmentation in the eurozone is by and large over – so spreads between core countries and periphery bank lending is over; spreads between corporates and SMEs have narrowed down a lot.
Question: You mentioned earlier the need for a public backstop to prevent possible fire sale of NPLs. Could you expand on that? What form could it take?
And a second question about NPLs especially in Italy, which happens to be our country: how urgent is the need for capital, and how big? Because some of the steps that you mentioned earlier are steps that are fairly gradual and take time, but sometimes the market feels like the problem is urgent and cannot wait.
Draghi: On the first question, public backstop is a measure that would be very useful but certainly should be agreed with the Commission according to the existing rules. It’s important, and it’s even more important given the existing rules. So what shape should it take? All this should be agreed with the Commission, and DG Competition especially.
The second point about the NPLs in Italy: I think the very first measure – well, certainly, it’s a big problem. It’s going to take time. It has taken time everywhere, by the way. To address the NPLs when they reach this size has taken time more or less everywhere. But we should be aware that the longer we have this in place, the less functioning will be the banking system, or at least will be the banks with high NPLs, and so the less capable will be these banks to transmit our monetary policy impulses to the real economy. Also, a high level of NPLs makes banks especially vulnerable to the markets. As we’ve seen recently, bank equity stocks were hit especially for those banks with a high level of NPLs. And one of the reasons why this is so is that the future level of profitability comes into question because a lot of capital is stuck against this level of NPLs.
So on one hand there is an interest in trying to resolve this serious problem as fast as one can. On the other hand, one is bound by the fact that it’s by its nature a problem that is slow to be resolved. So the question is what can be done to accelerate the solution of this problem? One of the measures is to have a well functioning market for NPLs. What is needed for such a market to develop? Several things, but one is in my view dominant, namely to create a legislative framework where the NPLs can be traded and sold easily. Some steps have been undertaken in Italy in recent times; they’re certainly steps in the right direction. More should be done, and should be done especially to address the legacy NPLs, the past stock of NPLs. In other words, the legislative changes should be such that the legacy NPLs could be adequately addressed.
Question: I’d like to follow up on what my colleague just said on this proposal on institutional reform. The main idea was that there is not enough appetite in the countries to go ahead with further integration of fiscal policies, so we’d need a market-based solution which includes debt restructuring and creditor participation and so on and so on, extension of maturities. I was wondering whether you think this goes in the right direction, or whether it should better not be undertaken.
Second question: the IMF has singled out a large, Frankfurt-based financial institution as a main risk for financial stability, and my question would be whether you share their concerns.
Draghi: The second question is easy to answer: I won’t comment on specific banking institutions.
On the first question, the changes that are being suggested may be rational in their own sake, but it’s very important that they take place in the proper framework. In other words, can we have a debt restructuring mechanism in absence of a common budget, or the somewhat more advanced idea of a common fiscal policy? Are we sure that we have examined all the implications for financial markets, for financial stability, and more generally for stability at large, of big changes in the treatment of sovereign debt? So I think these questions, or these proposals, which have their own rationale if taken by themselves, ought to be reframed in a more complete framework than the one we have today.
Question: Members of the European Parliament have repeatedly called for the EBA to be moved from London to Frankfurt, because of the proximity to the ECB. Do you support these calls? Do you think it would be desirable, to make your work easier?
Draghi: Well, I didn’t know that, but I have no specific view on that.
Question: Is there a clear commitment of the ECB system towards banknotes and coins as sole legal tender, and if so why do you bury the €500 note?
Draghi: Yes, of course. There is. We didn’t bury the €500 notes. We decided that the €500 note is, I would say, a good instrument in hands that are not exactly proper hands. In other words, as someone said, we don’t want to draw seigniorage from comfort to criminals. And so we decided to stop production in some years – I think 2018, if I’m not mistaken, the beginning or end of 2018 – of the €500 note but it will stay in circulation and it can be converted at any time in the future. So it will have legal tender.
Question: And my second question: is it true that your son is a bond dealer in London, and if so wouldn’t it be a conflict of interest?
Draghi: This very same question was asked to me five years ago when I started this job. I answered that he’s not a bank dealer; he’s a trader in London, and that’s it. And it’s not conflict of interest. And the European Parliament didn’t believe so.
Question: I just want to pick up on your point about the solvency of the banks and the improvements that we’ve seen since the financial crisis, and the respective concerns about profitability. I just wonder, when we look around Europe and we see some of the largest and the most strategically important banks trading at or around record lows, that suggests something bigger that profitability concerns, and even solvency concerns in some cases. Do you think there is still a structural lack of confidence in the European banking sector, and do you think investors are perhaps overemphasising the risks?
My second question is, we’ve seen a recovery, a significant recovery in equity markets in particular, since the Brexit vote, but the data suggests that international investors are heading for the door. And I think when they look particularly across the water they see a fractured European Union, they see low growth, high inflation, terrorism, geopolitical risk fuelling nationalism, and politicians that are in many cases failing to respond. I just wondered how you respond, both as a European, and secondly as the head of the central bank of the eurozone.
Draghi: Let me respond to the second question first. Our response lies in achieving our mandate, in achieving our objective. Our response lies in ensuring what we call price stability, but in fact amounts to growth and job creation. Our response lies in making sure the labour markets continue to improve. And that’s our domain. That’s our job. We consider this to be a very important contribution for also addressing the other sides of our continent that create so much worry in the rest of the world’s eyes, and that’s what we do. That’s what we are accountable for and that’s what we believe we will succeed in.
On your first question, I don’t want to downplay the situation. To say that it’s not a solvency problem but it’s a future profitability problem doesn’t mean that one downplays the problem. It’s just, figure-wise, we see that from a solvency viewpoint our banks are better off than years ago, but certainly they do have profitability issues, and especially the banks with a high share of NPLs, but not only banks with a high share of NPLs. Some of it has to do with the weak growth performance of the past few years. But I’m pretty confident that strong supervision and robust regulation, and better communication, indeed, by the supervisory authorities, the EBA and all this, will still improve the situation and the perception in the rest of the world’s eyes.

Die Preisträger des Deutschen Studienpreises 2016 stehen fest

MIL OSI – Source: Koerber Stiftung – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Die Preisträger des Deutschen Studienpreises 2016 stehen fest

Meldung vom Freitag, 22. Juli 2016

Die drei mit je 25.000 Euro dotierten Spitzenpreise des Deutschen Studienpreises 2016 gehen an die Politologin Astrid Séville, die Maschinenbauingenieurin Elisabeth Wilhelm und den Rechtswissenschaftler Tom Pleiner.
Die Politikwissenschaftlerin Astrid Séville untersuchte die sogenannte TINA-Rhetorik (»There is no alternative«) als moderne Regierungstechnik und beschreibt deren Effekte unter anderem am Beispiel des EU-Krisenmanagements: Politiker stellen ihre Entscheidungen als einzig vernünftige oder moralisch gebotene dar, Widerspruch erscheint als irrational und illegitim. Eine offene politische Diskussion findet nicht mehr statt, was letztlich zu Politikverdrossenheit und dem Erstarken extremer Parteien führt.
Ob Piktogramme, Touch-Screen oder Emoticon – digitale Grafiken sollen die Bedienung von Computer und Smartphone erleichtern. Für Sehgeschädigte erschweren sie jedoch die Nutzung. Die Ingenieurin Elisabeth Wilhelm entwickelte ein grafikfähiges Computer-Display für Blinde, das grafische Inhalte fühlbar anzeigt.
Für die Energiewende ist ein Netzausbau zwingend. Gegen neue Stromtrassen regt sich jedoch der Unmut von Anwohnern und Umweltverbänden. Der Jurist Tom Pleiner hat in seiner Dissertation die relevanten rechtlichen Vorschriften und die Verwaltungspraxis ausgewertet und einen überzeugenden Lösungsvorschlag entwickelt: Das Recht muss der Überplanung des großen Bestandes alter Leitungen konsequent den Vorzug gegenüber dem Bau von neuen Trassen geben.
Die Preise werden am 8. November vom Schirmherrn des Deutschen Studienpreises, Bundestagspräsident Norbert Lammert, in Berlin überreicht.
Pressemeldung

Ministry of Finance and the SFS find a fast solution for one of key problems affecting business

MIL OSI – Source: Government of Ukraine – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Ministry of Finance and the SFS find a fast solution for one of key problems affecting business

Upon request of Minister of Finance Oleksandr
Danyliuk, the State Fiscal Service has issued an
executive order on July 20 which is meant to solve one of key issues for
business. Regulations set by this order shall significantly reduce the number
of criminal proceedings against business.

What is the problem?

The State Fiscal Service used to initiate criminal
prosecution based on the results of tax checks which could be disputed at the
court. In most cases, no evidence for criminal actions could be retrieved.
According to the data of Business Ombudsman Algirdas Shemeta, 1748 criminal proceedings were started in 2015
with only 55 of them being passed to the court with formal charges. The State
Fiscal Service detected several dozen felons only, but more than 1.5 thousand
innocent businesses were affected its investigations.

This issue was raised by business representatives at a
meeting which took place on July 12. The Minister of Finance ordered the Head
of the SFS to settle it.

Solution

From now on, the tax police will be only receiving tax check
files upon completion of all administrative and court opposition procedures.
Hence, criminal prosecution will only be started, if there is real evidence for
criminal actions.

It means that the SFS wont be able to put business under
pressure for no reason, if there is no proof for felony. If an entrepreneur
does not agree with the SFS decision on his tax liabilities and files a protest
at the court, criminal prosecution can only be started, if the investigator in
charge finds real evidence for criminal action.

What is the benefit?

This solution shall significantly reduce the number of
unauthorized criminal proceedings against business and improve the business
environment.

What next?

The situation must be settled completely and in a systemic
way through the comprehensive reform of the SFS which is being elaborated by
the Parliaments committee for tax affairs, the Ministry of Finance and
experts. The next step will be the liquidation of the tax police and the
creation of a new agency for financial investigations which, contrary to the
tax police, will be focused on analytical work and service.

Canadian Military Police instructors deliver training course for Ukrainian Military Law Enforcement Service specialists

MIL OSI – Source: Government of Ukraine – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Canadian Military Police instructors deliver training course for Ukrainian Military Law Enforcement Service specialists

A group of the Ukrainian servicemen has been
undergoing two-week training course delivered by the Canadian Military
Police instructors. This course is conducted in the framework
of agreements between Main Directorate of the Ukraines Military Law
Enforcement Service and Defence Attaché Office at the Embassy
of Canada to Ukraine.

This is a Course for servicemen of Military
Law Enforcement Service on pre-trial investigation. We teach our
students to keep a diary, then to plan actions at the
scene. At the end, we train them how to conduct interviews with
witnesses and suspects, Maj. Paul Mellema, Course
Manager, told.

Currently, 20 students are undergoing this training
delivered by the qualified and experienced Canadian instructors. The
graduates will pass exams and receive certificates.

Volodymyr Groysman summons a meeting to tackle the state of Ukraine's preparation for the upcoming autumn-winter period

MIL OSI – Source: Government of Ukraine – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Volodymyr Groysman summons a meeting to tackle the state of Ukraine's preparation for the upcoming autumn-winter period

Prime Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Groysman held a meeting
dedicated to the problematic issues in the energy sector and measures to
prepare the fuel and energy complex for 2016-17 autumn-winter period. The participants discussed urgent problems of the
fuel industry, in particular the provision of coal, electricity, and the
situation in the gas sector.

“Winter is not far off, and it’s the middle of summer
the time when we need to draw conclusions regarding what tasks should be set in
the center and in the regions in order to pass the
autumn and winter without problems, to provide people with electrical energy,
heating, water, to organize properly clean-up of Ukrainian roads. I consider
that it all depends on proper coordination of work between ministries and local
authorities, and clear determining of priorities basing on the tasks for us to
solve”, said Volodymyr Groysman on opening the meeting.

The Prime Minister noted the need for the search of ways to
diversify deliveries of coal, and gave a task to provide logistical support and
transportation of it. In addition, we need to increase the share of nuclear
power generation industry, he said. “We are talking about the national
security of our country”, he stressed.

The next Staffs meeting is due in August, said Volodymyr
Groysman. The Staff will operate steadily. “I need constant monitoring of
the tasks that you perform to ensure our readiness to the autumn-winter
period”, he emphasized.

The meeting was attended by Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine
Volodymyr Kistion, Minister of Energy and Coal
Industry of Ukraine Ihor Nasalyk,
Director of the Board of PJSC Ukrzaliznytsia Wojciech Balczun,
President of State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company
Energoatom Yurii Nedashkovsky,
Director of SE Energorynok Yurii
Gnatiuk, Chairman National Energy and Utilities
Regulatory Commission Dmytro Vovk,
Director of the Board of NJSC Naftogaz Ukrainy Andrii Kobolev and
representatives of ministries and departments of central bodies of executive
authorities.

Sonett: Verantwortung für das Wasser als Träger alles Lebendigen

MIL OSI – Source: GLS Bank – Press Release/Statement

Headline: Sonett: Verantwortung für das Wasser als Träger alles Lebendigen

Ein Interview mit Gerhard Heid (67), über Nachhaltigkeit und die Arbeitsweise des Unternehmens Sonett. Der GLS Kunde stellt seit 1977 ökologische Waschmittel her. Der Diplom Kaufmann hat seit 1992 gemeinsam mit Beate Oberdorfer, Dipl. Lebensmittel-Chemikerin, die Geschäftsführung des Unternehmens inne. Mithilfe der GLS Bank konnte Sonett den Bau für das neue Logistikzentrum finanzieren.
Was verbirgt sich hinter dem Leitsatz von Sonett: „Mittel für Waschen und Reinigen, die das Wasser achten als Träger alles Lebendigen“?
Der Produktionsprozess ist im vollen Gange
Eins steht fest: Wer das Wasser schädigt, schädigt das Leben. Der Gründungsimpuls für Sonett ist die Verantwortung für das Wasser als Träger alles Lebendigen. Das motiviert uns auch heute noch.Der Naturwissenschaftler Johannes Schnorr stellte Mitte der 60er Jahre  am anthroposophischen Institut für Strömungsforschung fest, wie verunreinigt das Grundwasser und die Gewässer mit Wasch- und Putzmittel waren. Daraufhin entwickelte er die Idee des Waschens im Baukastensystem mit Inhaltsstoffen, die zu 100 Prozent  biologisch abbaubar sind und durch die separate Dosierung von Basiswaschmittel, Enthärter und Bleichmittel die Ressourcen auf der Erde schont.
Worin unterscheiden sich Wasch- und Reinigungsmittel von Sonett konkret von  herkömmlichen Produkten?
Wir gehen davon aus, dass Wasser das  eigentliche Reinigungsmittel ist. Waschmittel unterstützen das Wasser lediglich bei der Reinigung. Sonett arbeitet auf drei Qualitätsebenen. Erstens werden unsere Wasch-und Reinigungsmittel ausschließlich aus pflanzlichen und mineralischen Rohstoffen gefertigt. Wir verwenden keine Produkte aus Erdöl oder künstliche Duft- und Farbstoffe und auch keine synthetische Konservierungsstoffe -um nur einige Beispiele zu nennen.  Auch Enzyme finden sich nicht in unseren Produkten. Das ist sehr besonders in dieser Branche. Die meisten Waschmittelproduzenten nutzen Enzyme von gentechnisch veränderten Mikroorganismen. Diese können Allergien hervorrufen.  Zweitens, wir verwenden viele Rohstoffe aus biologischem Anbau. Alle Pflanzenöle für unsere Seifen und 100 Prozent der ätherischen Öle sind aus kontrolliert biologischem Anbau. Nach unserem Wissen einzigartig ist unsere dritte Qualitätsstufe, der Einsatz lebenfördernder Technik. Nach der Fertigstellung der Wasch- und Reinigungsmittel wird diesen ein Präparat beigefügt, das in einem Oloid-Mischer rhythmitisiert wurde. Diese balsamischen Zusätze bestehen aus Weihrauch, Gold, Myrrhe, Lorbeer, Olivenöl, Rosenasche und Mistel. Außerdem arbeiten wir mit Prozesswasser, das in 12 eiförmigen Glasgefäßen verwirbelt wird.
Inwiefern sind diese Anwendungen lebensfördernd?

Verwirbelung des Prozesswassers
Bei der Herstellung sind die Produkte den zentrifugalen Bewegungen der rotierenden Mischmaschinen ausgesetzt. Rotation ist tendenziell lebensfeindlich. Da die balsamischen Zusätze, unter Anwendung von rhythmischen Prozessen hergestellt wurden, haben diese eine Lebenskräfte aufbauende Wirkung. Durch die Präparate fügen wir den Wasch- und Reinigungsmitteln diesen lebenfördernden Bewegungsimpuls bei. Durch die Verwirbelung des Prozesswassers, das sind ca. 10.000 Liter täglich, wird dieses zu Quellwasserqualität aufgewertet. Dadurch unterstützen wir die rasche Rückführung und die Renaturierung des Abwassers, zurück in den Kreislauf der Natur.
Sonett hat anthroposophische Wurzeln, auch der Einsatz von rhythmischen Prozessen ist eine Methode, die in der Anthroposophie Anwendung finden. Gibt es heute noch weitere Verbindungen zur Anthroposophie?
Ja definitiv. Unsere anthroposophischen Wurzeln äußern sich heute wie zu Gründungszeiten in dem Verständnis über das, was Leben ist und über das, was Verantwortung gegenüber dem Lebendigen bedeutet. Nachhaltigkeit ist in Mode und im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch weitverbreitet. Doch leider wird darunter oft verstanden, dass das Überleben der Menschen auf der Erde ein bisschen verlängert wird.  Das entspricht nicht unserem Verständnis des Begriffs. Wir wollen die Natur nicht nur weniger schädigen, wir wollen sie vielmehr veredeln. Die Natur soll durch den Menschen besser werden. In der der bioloisch – dynamischen Landwirtschaft ist dies  bereits eine anerkannte und verbreitete Einstellung. Sonett möchte diese Denkweise auch auf Waschmittel anwenden.
Wie stehen Sie zu Tierversuchen?
Sonett hat noch nie Tierversuche durchgeführt und wir haben diese noch nie in Auftrag gegeben. Das widerspricht unserem ethischen Verständnis. Generell sind Tierversuche in unserer Branche seit 1998 verboten. Allerdings muss per Gesetz jeder chemische Stoff, der neu entwickelt wird, vor seiner Verwendung an Tieren geprüft werden. Somit wurden alle industriell genutzten Stoffe oder Chemikalien irgendwann schon einmal an Tieren getestet. Wir unterstützen deshalb seit Jahren die Akademie des Deutschen Tierschutzbundes für Ihre Forschungen zur Entwicklung alternativer Testmethoden zu Tierversuchen.
Verwenden Sie tierische Inhaltsstoffe für Ihre Produkte?

Die Produkte unterliegen einer genauen Prüfung
Tierische Inhaltsstoffe sind bei uns absolute Ausnahmen (3 von 52 Produkten). Wir verwenden  beispielsweise Gallseife aus Rindergalle als Fleckenentferner, ein traditionelles Mittel, dessen grandiose Wirkung allenfalls durch harte Chemie zu ersetzen wäre.  In der Wollkur kommt Wollfett und in der Bodenwischpflege Schellackwachs zum Einsatz.
Wie entwickelt sich die Nachfrage nach ökologischem Waschmittel von Sonett?
Die Nachfrage nach unseren Produkten wächst stetig. Wir verkaufen unsere Produkte hauptsächlich in Naturkostläden. Geographisch gesehen ist die Nachfrage in Europa am stärksten, vor allem in Deutschland. Hier werden 45 Prozent unserer Produkte verkauft. Außerhalb von Europa ist Japan unser größter Abnehmer, aber auch Südkorea Taiwan, Australien oder Dubai. Auch der chinesische Markt für ökologische Waschmittel fängt langsam an zu wachsen.
Wie viele Mitarbeiter hat Sonett?
Sonett ist in den letzten Jahren stark gewachsen. Heute arbeiten 64 Mitarbeiter in dem Standort in Deggenhausen. Außerdem haben wir eine Kooperation mit den Camphill Werkstätten Lehenshof. 25 Menschen mit besonderem Hilfebedarf arbeiten für Sonett. Es werden Produkte abgefüllt und etikettiert. Außerdem bietet das Unternehmen Absolventen der Drogenheilstätte Sieben Zwerge die Chance für einen beruflichen Neuanfang.

On appointment of provisional administration (7/22/2016)

MIL OSI – Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation in English – Press Release/Statement

Headline: On appointment of provisional administration (7/22/2016)

In compliance with Clause 2 of Article 18926 and Articles 18931, 18932 and 18935 of the Federal Law ‘On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)’ and following revocation of the banking licence of the Moscow-based credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company) or Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) (Registration No. 5, date of registration — 9 April 1991), the Bank of Russia took a decision (Order No. OD-2340, dated 22 July 2016) to appoint from 22 July 2016 a provisional administration to manage the credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company) for a term in accordance with the Federal Law ‘On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)’ until the arbitration court adjudication on the recognition of bankruptcy and initiation of bankruptcy proceedings (appointment of a receiver) or until the arbitration court adjudication on the appointment of a liquidator becomes valid.
Vadim A. Gryaznov, chief economist of the consolidation and statistics sector of the consolidation and statistics section of the Yaroslavl Regional Division, has been appointed as a head of the provisional administration of the credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company).
The provisional administration of the credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company) includes Ye. N. Chepurnova, S. V. Markelova, N. A. Volkova, Ye. V. Kuzmin, A. M. Davydov, O. S. Kudryavtseva, O. R. Chernykh, Ye. P. Putilina, Yu. G. Mezentsev, S. V. Rufimsky, O. A. Parkhomenko, I. S. Melnikova, V. M. Tarasov, S. P. Doronin, A. N. Davidenko, T. N. Abakumova, P. A. Savkin, and S. V. Belyakova.

On revocation of banking licence (7/22/2016)

MIL OSI – Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation in English – Press Release/Statement

Headline: On revocation of banking licence (7/22/2016)

Due to the non-compliance by the Moscow-based credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company) or Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations, all capital adequacy ratios being below 2 percent, decrease in capital below the minimal value of the authorised capital established by the Bank of Russia as of the date of the state registration of the credit institution, repeated application within a year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law ‘On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)’, and guided by Article 19, Clause 6 of Part 1 and Clauses 1 and 2 of Part 2 of Article 20 of the Federal Law ‘On Banks and Banking Activities’ and Part 11 of Article 74 of the Federal Law ‘On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)’, the Bank of Russia took a decision (Order No. OD-2339, dated 22 July 2016) to revoke the banking licence of the credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company) (Bank of Russia Registration No. 5, date of registration — 9 April 1991) from 22 July 2016.

On revocation of banking licence of credit institution Credit-Moscow and appointment of provisional administration (7/22/2016)

MIL OSI – Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation in English – Press Release/Statement

Headline: On revocation of banking licence of credit institution Credit-Moscow and appointment of provisional administration (7/22/2016)

By its Order No. OD-2339, dated 22 July 2016, the Bank of Russia revoked a banking licence of the Moscow-based credit institution Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Credit-Moscow (public joint-stock company) or Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) (Registration No. 5) from 22 July 2016.
The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure — revocation of the banking licence — due to the credit institution’s failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations, capital adequacy ratios being below 2 percent, decrease in capital below the minimal value of the authorised capital established by the Bank of Russia as of the date of the state registration of the credit institution, and the repeated application within a year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law ‘On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)’.
Given unsatisfactory quality of its assets, Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) inadequately assessed the risks assumed. A proper assessment of the credit risk on a supervisor’s demand revealed a full loss of the bank’s capital. Both management and owners of the credit institution did not take any effective measures to bring its activities back to normal. Under these circumstances based on Article 20 of the Federal Law ‘On Banks and Banking Activities’ the Bank of Russia fulfilled its duty to revoke the banking licence of Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC).
By its Order No. OD-2340, dated 22 July 2016, the Bank of Russia has appointed a provisional administration to Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Federal Law ‘On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)’ or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law ‘On Banks and Banking Activities’. In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit institution’s executive bodies are suspended.
Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) is a member of the deposit insurance system. The revocation of the banking licence is an insured event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ ‘On the Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian Banks’ in respect of the bank’s retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation. The said Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank’s depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of 100% of the balance of funds but not more than 1.4 million rubles per depositor.
According to reporting data, as of 1 July 2016, Bank Credit-Moscow (PJSC) ranked 285th in the Russian banking system in terms of assets.